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| Dr Shafiq Sit |
In the first part of his report, DR SHAFIQ SIT revisits the roots of the changing strategic landscape in Europe back in the 1970s and 1980s. He now reconsiders the implications of those tumultuous developments then in the wake of the neo-nationalistic mood of the early 21st century such as Brexit, and whether this signals the weakening of the EURO bloc and what it would mean for the Asia-Pacific countries.
Figuratively speaking, just as Europe traversed the difficult part from Yalta in 1945, Asia has found the road from Bandung in 1955 till today equally long and winding.
Back then, with the dismantling of the Cold War in Europe, Asian states had to adapt and realign their foreign policy accordingly. For example, Jakarta’s shift towards normalisation of relations with Beijing and Moscow was only symptomatic of more foreign policy readjustments to find its place in the sun.
In fact, if one were to examine closely the sequence of events, one can be sure that some reshuffling of strategic priorities in Asia had already taken place before the opening of the Brandenburg Gates.
Prior to the snow-balling of political reforms in Eastern Europe and then also in Western Europe, an uncertain mode in foreign policy-making vis-a-vis Europe had surfaced in both communist and non-communist Asian capitals.
The New & Old Communist regimes
Undoubtedly the reactions of the communist regimes in Asia, namely those in China, North Korea and Vietnam, are important to the rest of Asia. The question that needs to be answered is not so much why the communist regimes in Asia have appeared less susceptible to change then their Eastern-European counterparts. But more so what the new pre-occupation in Eastern Europe to be more developed economically (and richer so to speak) would mean for these communist regimes in the broader picture of change.
Direct non-impact to the Eastern Asian regimes?
Undeniably the difference is stark. Unlike the East European regimes which were imposed from the outside by a victorious Red Army in 1945, the communist parties of China, Korea an Vietnam were created internally or grew organically through a long resistance and struggle which had created in their peoples an intrinsic sense of Communist-nationalism.
Nonetheless the wind of change in Europe had created a mood not only among the people striving for a better living in say North Korea, but also within the Governments and regimes themselves to pre-empt any resurrection of the Tiananmen spirit. To this end, it is still too early to conclude that communist Asia will remain forever unchanged for better or worse. The Coronavirus COVID-19 is the latest threat to test the regimes’ handling of public welfare.
Indirect impact
What is clear is that it is not inconceivable that there will be some indirect impact on these communist regimes resulting from their own perception of being left behind economically as the non-communist States in Asia hasten their economic acts and pursue economic growth. The Beijing government US$ 10 billion economic stimulus mirroring the KL move in 2020 is one example at hand.
The vicious circle of needing to stay relevant in an international order beset by change will ensure that as the newly-industrialised economies (NIEs) and ASEAN economies react and try to fast track fiscal policies, some impact will be felt in the communist countries of Asia.
For if the primacy of economics in a global economic race is to count for something, then these regimes will have to adapt and redefine their own economic security. Vietnam is a good example.
Underpinnings of economic security
To appreciate the importance of the economic security argument, let us reexamine the rationale underlying Japan’s foreign policy directions vis-a-vis Eastern Europe then and how Tokyo is busy fine-tuning its economic aid policies. In doing so, one can appreciate the strategic importance of Eastern Europe to Japan as well as infer lessons for the other non-communist Asian economies.
Prior to Japan’s announcement at Brussels (November 1989) of the new aid package for Poland and Hungary as part of its official development assistance (ODA) programme, the Eastern European country to receive ODA was Yugoslavia, to an amount of only $1.5 million. The contrast then was obvious. ODA to Asian countries had totalled approximately $4 billion in 1988.
Some even argued then that Eastern Europe will provide the back-door to the European Community (EC) and European Free Trade Association (EFTA) for Japan. To understand the motives, one should examine also why support from Eastern Europe is vital to Japan.
There are at least six reasons. First, Japan is reawakening {long overdue) and has grown tired of immobilism, fed-up of the constraints imposed since 1945. No longer satisfied with being the zombie actor ie. being an economic giant but a political dwarf, Japan appears to be set to engage again in the reshaping of a new international order. Perhaps not to the extent of a Pax Nipponica but in that direction.
Eastern Europe provides the opportunity for Japan to prove that she is not a free rider and in the process help acclimatise the Europeans as a whole to a more amenable perception of Japan as a trustworthy trading partner.
Second, Eastern Europe provides a key for Japan to manoeuvre and to become less dependent on the US-Japan strategic alliance. The controversies over burden sharing, Self-Defence Forces etc. have plagued Tokyo’s agenda.
Today one observation stands out and fuels the anti-American sentiments in Tokyo i.e. although both Germany and Japan have achieved economic superpower status, there is blatant asymmetry on the issue of re-transfer of sovereignty. Given that German reunification is completed, Japan’s autonomy is still severely constrained by article nine of her 1949 peace constitution.
Third, Japan also stands to gain not only in the automotive sector, competing with eg.European cars vis-a-vis the US, the Soviet Union and other trading partners, but also to harness the goodwill of the European Economic Community (EEC). Tokyo sees this as crucial so as to avert the protection barriers of 1992.
Fourth, given Japan’s involvement in Western Europe, Japan cannot help but ensure that the changes in the East will not jeopardise its investments in the West.
To this end, Tokyo is compelled not only to help Western Europe but also to reduce the political burden and financial obligations of the Eastern legacies on Moscow in order to promote stabilisation in Europe.
Fifth, Japan’s role in Eastern Europe will signal its intentions to improve relations in Moscow. Clearly, if the reforms in Eastern Europe had fail, perestroika (restructuring) would have been impeded and Japan-Soviet relations would have been adversely affected.
Significantly this also feeds back into reducing the constraint set by the US-Japan strategic alliance or at the very least gives Tokyo a Russian card to play with.
A sixth, it never hurts to have another “card” to facilitate bargaining whether with the US, the Soviet Union or China in the foreseeable future. Equally this card will allow Japan to tap into the future market potential as well as to have larger manufacturing capacities in the Europe.
Lessons to be inferred
From the above reasons, Japan’s intentions should be clear. Bearing in mind that Japan will read, react and help define some of the contours for the non-communist economies of Asia, many lessons can be drawn and some should be learnt. At the very least, the same raison d’etre is somewhat applicable for the newly-industrialised economies. For Malaysia, the logic for adopting similar measures should be evident.
Relegation?
So where do all these factors lead Asia? The upshot is that greater Euro-centricism will gravitate some parts of Asian concerns, notwithstanding the outcome for Japan, to the peripheral side-show.
Our Prime Minister Datuk Seri Dr Mahathir Mohamad has rightly pointed out that this pre-occupation is increasingly blatant and was clearly reflected by the poor turnout of senior European leaders during the Asean-EC ministerial meeting in Kuching (NST. Feb 20).
At the same time, it is by no historical accident that Singapore’s Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew anxiously stated in Berne that Western Europe should not concentrate on Eastern Europe to the exclusion of Asia.
Underlying such rhetoric is the anxiety that Europe may relegate the Asia-Pacific agenda. Such anxiety has been evident since the call for greater co-operation in the Asia-Pacific region at the Canberra meeting in November last year.
Whether Asia-Pacific economic co-operation (Apec) becomes a reality or not, all Asian economies will have to work harder in order to offer competitive low manufacturing and development costs for its Western trading and investment partners.
North-South divide in Asia
Given this drive for heightened competition, there will be some dichotomous effects for Asia. On the one hand the political reforms in Eastern Europe could mean greater opportunities for trading and investment for the advanced Asian countries such as Japan and South Korea while, on the other, it could imply a possible shifting away of Japan’s attention in trading and manufacturing investment from the not-so-advanced Asian economies such as the Philippines.
Overall direct impact
Simple logic tells us that the European ailments will demand much attention. It also follows then that US Secretary of State James Baker’s vision of “a new Europe and a new Atlanticism” would mean some form of diversion in both Western European and the United States interests from the Asia-Pacific region.
But whether and to what extent the Asian economies will drift towards neglect or will rise alongside Japan in a new era of multipolarity will depend ultimately on their ability to respond to the prevailing strategic and economic imperatives.
Let it be said that the Europeans are not merely sitting back to await our reactions. Some like Great Britain has spoken. Brexit is plain for all to see. For Asian countries, it is a testing time which demands urgent but responsible rethinking of their role and place in international politics.
Ideally, both sides of the Asia-Europe divide will have to ensure that the opportunity is not seized upon to selfishly create a brighter future for each side at the expense of the other, but championed for the common cause of peace and prosperity.
In practice, Asian States will have to decide not only whether ideology should continue to be used as an instrument of the state to divide Asia itself into communist and non-communist blocs. But also whether racism should be allowed to continue as an impediment for discriminating between “whites” in Europe and the “non-whites” in Asia.
Undeniably such an objective is difficult to realise but unless efforts are made to alleviate the problem, there will be no progress. As a simple example, both Europe and Asia have the choice either to compete fiercely in all sectors or to improve the ties in the forms of joint ventures.
We must bear in mind that unilateralism coupled with a tinge of racism in this wind of change will create conditions conducive for autarky and economic nationalism, where warcraft may emerge from its neighboring nearby shadows. Could it really be that the COVID-19 is God sent to test and compel the world leaders to sit down and begin to resolve some of the pressing global problems? Epidemic? Global warming?
Let us not make “a brave new Europe confronting Asia” more than an eclectic phrase for intellectual discourse. Should we falter now, the moment would be, as the cliche goes, gone with the wind.
The writer is a Malaysian Rhodes doctorate scholar at Oxford University. He is currently an ISIS research associate and lectures on strategic planning and defence policy at Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia.
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